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Abstract— The deployment of autonomous systems that op-
erate in unstructured environments necessitates algorithms to
verify their safety. This can be challenging due to, e.g., black-
box components in the control software, or undermodelled
dynamics that prevent model-based verification. We present a
novel verification framework for an unknown dynamical system
from a given set of noisy observations of the dynamics. Using
Gaussian processes trained on this data set, the framework
abstracts the system as an uncertain Markov process with
discrete states defined over the safe set. The transition bounds of
the abstraction are derived from the probabilistic error bounds
between the regression and underlying system. An existing
approach for verifying safety properties over uncertain Markov
processes then generates safety guarantees. We demonstrate
the versatility of the framework on several examples, including
switched and nonlinear systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to provide formal guarantees is essential for
safety-critical systems. Without assurances, innovations such
as self-driving cars, medical robotics, and autonomous aerial
vehicles will remain bounded to narrow domains. To address
this need, formal verification offers powerful frameworks
with rigorous analysis techniques [1], [2]. They provide
formal guarantees with respect to the system model. In many
applications, however, an accurate model of an autonomous
system is either unavailable due to, e.g., the use of a black-
box controllers, or if available, it is not in a closed form
that can be used for formal verification. This work focuses
on this challenge and aims to develop a verification method
that can provide safety guarantees for systems with unknown
dynamics.
Formal verification of control systems has been widely
studied, e.g., [3]–[9]. These methods are typically based on
model checking algorithms [1], [2], which take a simple
discrete, finite model and return a yes or no as to whether the
model satisfies a given specification. To bridge the gap be-
tween continuous and discrete domains, those works construct
an abstraction, a finite representation of the control system
with a simulation relation [10]. This abstraction is in the form
of a finite graph if the underlying system is deterministic or
a finite Markov process if the underlying system is stochastic.
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Even though they admit strong guarantees, these methods are
model-based and require full knowledge of the system model.
Hence, they cannot be employed for analysis of systems with
unknown dynamics.
In the controls literature, a recent body of work is emerging
that focuses on data-driven analysis of dynamical systems,
e.g., [11]–[14]. Those studies assume partial knowledge about
the system and provide some performance assurances. The
work in [12] uses techniques based on Bayesian inference
to compute the confidence over a property of interest
for partly unknown linear systems. Work [13] introduces
an algorithm based on chance-constrained optimization to
provide probabilistic stability guarantees for an unknown
switched linear system from a finite number of observations of
trajectories. Despite their strengths, those data-driven methods
assume the unknown model is linear. Work [14] relaxes this
assumption and considers safety assessment of a dynamical
system whose model is fully unknown. The proposed method
is based on approximation of the dynamics using a piecewise-
polynomial function and safety assessment through barrier
certificates. This safety analysis is sound with respect to the
polynomial function but cannot be extended to the underlying
system in a straightforward manner.
A powerful approach to approximate an unknown function
is Gaussian process (GP) regression [15]. GP regression is
a Bayesian machine-learning framework, which has been
receiving special attention in safety-critical applications due
to its ability to capture the uncertainty in the learning
process [16], [17]. Recent works [18]–[21] successfully derive
theoretical bounds on the distance between the regressed GP
and the underlying (unknown) system. These results have led
to the increased use of GPs in safe learning frameworks, e.g.,
[22]–[25]. In [22], [23], the proposed algorithms learn the
unknown dynamics as a GP model, which is then used within
a reinforcement learning algorithm to learn a reachability
policy under safety constraints. Similarly, [24] introduces a
method of learning a policy safely based on GP modeling with
stability guarantees. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether those
algorithms designed for learning policies can be employed
for formal verification purposes.
In this work, we focus on the safety verification of
control systems with unknown dynamics via GP regression.
We introduce an algorithm that, given a set of noisy data,
generates formal probabilistic guarantees for the unknown
system to remain in a given safe set for every initial state.
The algorithm uses a discretization of the safe set and GP
regression to construct a finite abstraction with probabilistic
bounds. This abstraction is in the form of an uncertain Markov
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model that captures all possible behaviors of the unknown
system through a derivation for the error bounds between
the regression and underlying system. Then, the algorithm
determines the safety probability bounds for the unknown
system by performing safety verification on the abstraction.
The main contribution of this work is a framework for
formal verification of unknown dynamical systems. This is
the first abstraction-based verification technique that does not
assume known dynamics to the best of our knowledge. This
work lays the theoretical foundation for formal reasoning
about unknown systems against complex specifications given,
e.g., as temporal logic formulas [2]. Another contribution of
the paper is a derivation of probability bounds on the transition
from a point to a region for the unknown dynamics. These
bounds are general and hence can be applied to systems
with various levels of knowledge about their dynamics.
Furthermore, we provide a series of case studies to illustrate
the power of the method on linear, switched, and nonlinear
systems.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a controlled dynamical system with noisy obser-
vation (measurement) in the form of
x(k + 1) = f(x(k),u(k)),
y(k) = x(k) + v(k, u(k − 1)), (1)
where
x(k) ∈ Rn, u(k) ∈ U , y(k) ∈ Rn, v(k, u(k−1)) ∼ Du(k−1),
f : Rn × U → Rn is a possibly non-linear and unknown
function that represents the dynamics of the system, U =
{a1, . . . , a|U|} is a finite set of actions or control laws, and
for each a ∈ U , v(k, a) is a noise term sampled from
distribution Da. We assume the noise v is an arbitrary zero-
mean martingale difference sequence, i.e., for each k > 0
and k′ < k
E
[
v(k,u(k)) | v(k′,u(k′))] = 0.
We further assume that ‖v‖ < σ almost surely for some σ > 0
at each step k and that the noise on the various components
of x is independent, i.e., component vi is independent of vj
for i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Taking f as completely unknown may lead to an ill-posed
problem. We employ the following standard assumption [18],
which guarantees f is a well-behaved function that can be
approximated using GP regression.
Assumption 1. For a compact set K ⊂ Rn, let κ :
Rn × Rn → R>0 be a given kernel and Hκ(K) the
reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) of functions over K
corresponding to κ with norm ‖·‖κ [18]. Then, for each a ∈ U
and i ∈ {1, ..., n}, fi(·, a) ∈ Hκ(K) and for a constant
Bi > 0, ‖fi(·, a)‖κ ≤ Bi, where fi is the i-th component of
f .
Assumption 1 is a common assumption in GP regression [18]
that limits the class of functions that can be considered in
Process (1). In fact, the class of functions considered strictly
depends on the kernel under consideration. A universal kernel,
such as the widely-used squared exponential kernel, has the
property that Hκ(K) is a set which is dense in C(K) – the
set of continuous functions over K. That is, every continuous
function over K can be approximated arbitrarily well by
members of Hκ(K) [26].
Let ωx(k) = x0
u0−→ x1 u1−→ . . . uk−1−−−→ xk, where
x1, . . . , xk ∈ Rn, be a trajectory of Process (1) up to time
k with the observation (measurement) trajectory ωy(k) =
y0y1 . . . yk. Then, a control strategy pix is a measurable
function that selects an action (control law) at time k for the
system given the observation trajectory up to that time, i.e.,
pix(ωy(k)) ∈ U . Note that v is a stochastic process. As a
consequence, pix and x are stochastic processes.
A. Problem
The focus of this paper is the safety analysis of Process (1)
from a set of samples, each in the form of (x, u, y), where
y is an observation of Process (1) with state x and input
u. Note that this analysis needs to be probabilistic due to
the reasons stated above and the partial knowledge (finite
noisy samples) of Process (1). The focus is specifically on
the verification problem, where the goal is to check if a
given safety probability threshold is guaranteed. Therefore,
the problem is centered on computing the probability range
that x(k) remains safe for a given (possibly unbounded) time
horizon under all possible strategies. This problem is formally
defined below.
Problem 1. Let D = {(xi, ui, yi) | i ∈ {1, ..., nD}} be a
set of nD samples of Process (1). Then, for a compact safe
set Xsafe ⊂ Rn, a time-horizon T ∈ N ∪ {∞}, and every
x ∈ Xsafe, compute the bounds of safety probability Psafe(x)
defined by
pmin(x) = min
pix
Pr(∀k ∈ [0, T ], ωx(k) ∈ Xsafe |
x(0) = x, pix,D),
pmax(x) = max
pix
Pr(∀k ∈ [0, T ], ωx(k) ∈ Xsafe |
x(0) = x, pix,D).
That is, Psafe(x) ∈ [ pmin(x), pmax(x)] for all possible
strategies.
Note that Problem 1 is not concerned with finding the strat-
egy pix that maximizes (or minimizes) the safety probability.
Rather, it is focused on checking if a given safety probability
threshold is guaranteed for all possible strategies.
B. Approach
Our approach to Problem 1 is through a discrete abstraction
of Process (1) in a form of an uncertain Markov decision
process. A crucial part of the construction of this abstraction
is the derivation of the uncertainty bounds for the transition
probability of x(k) to region q′ ⊂ Rn given that x(k − 1) ∈
q ⊂ Rn. Section IV shows how these bounds can be computed
by incorporating the uncertainty from the GP learning process.
Intuitively, the regressed GP may not accurately approximate
the posterior of Process (1) since the observation noise v is
not Gaussian, i.e., v is bounded and the fact that only a finite
amount of data is available. A correction term that captures
this discrepancy is required. Section V proves the correctness
of the proposed method.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Our approach is based on GP regression and Markov
processes, which are formally defined in this section.
A. Gaussian Process Regression
Gaussian Process (GP) regression is a non-parametric
Bayesian machine learning method [15]. For an unknown
function f : Rn → R, the basic assumption of GP regression is
that f is a sample from a GP with zero mean1 and covariance
κ : Rn ×Rn → R>0. GP regression is often used when only
noisy observations of f are available in the form y = f(x)+v,
where v is assumed to be normally distributed with variance
σ2. Note that here y, v ∈ R are different from y, v ∈ Rn.
Consider a data set of noisy samples D = {(xi, yi), i ∈
{1, . . . , nD}}. Let X and Y be ordered vectors with all
points in D such that Xi = xi and Yi = yi. Further,
call K(X,X) the matrix with Ki,j(Xi, Xj) = κ(xi, xj),
K(x, X) the vector such that Ki(x, X) = κ(x, Xi), and
K(X, x) defined accordingly. Assuming the noise is i.i.d.,
the predictive distribution of f at a test point x is given by
the conditional distribution of f , which is Gaussian and with
mean µD and variance σ2D given by
µD(x) = K(x, X)
(
K(X,X) + λInD
)−1
Y
σ2D(x) = κ(x, x)−
K(x, X)
(
K(X,X) + λInD
)−1
K(X, x),
where InD is the identity matrix of size nD × nD and λ is
a free parameter (often taken to be σ2 when f is distributed
according to the posterior).
In our setting, we do not assume that f is sampled from
a GP and noise v is not Gaussian, so the assumptions for
GP regression are not satisfied. Nevertheless, Assumption 1
permits using GP regression even in our scenario. In particular,
the following Lemma provides a bound on the distance
between µD and f so long Assumption 1 holds. This is
an important result for safety verification, where the distance
between the regression and the true system needs to be
considered.
Lemma 1 ([20], Theorem 2). Let K be a compact set,
δ ∈ (0, 1), αD the maximum information gain parameter
associated with κ and data set D training points, and B > 0
such that ‖f‖κ ≤ B. Assume that |v| < σ almost surely
and µD and σD are found with λ = 1 + 2/nD. Define
β = (σ/
√
λ)(B + σ
√
2(αD + 1 + log 1/δ)). Then, it holds
that
Pr
(∀x ∈ K, |µD(x)− f(x)| ≤ βσD(x)) ≥ 1− δ.
1Extensions with non-zero mean are a trivial generalization [15]
Lemma 1 computes a probabilistic bound between the
regressed GP and the underlying unknown function and takes
into account the modelling errors in running GP regression
with observation noise with the parameter λ and scaling factor
(σ/
√
λ). The constraint on ‖f‖D implies f is Lf -Lipschitz
continuous with L2f ∝ B [24]. The information gain term ακ
can be upper bounded for certain kernel choices as shown in
[18].
B. Markov Processes
Our abstraction structure is based on Markov models.
Definition 1 (MDP). A Markov decision process (MDP) is a
tuple M = (Q,A, P ), where
• Q is a finite set of states,
• A is a finite set of actions,
• P : Q × A × Q → [0, 1] is a transition probability
function.
We denote the set of actions available at MDP state q ∈ Q
by A(q).
A path ω of an MDP is a sequence of states ω = q0
a0−→
q1
a1−→ q2 a2−→ . . . such that ai ∈ A(qi) and P (qi, ai, qi+1) >
0 for all i ∈ N. We denote the last state of a finite path ωfin
by last(ωfin) and the set of all finite and infinite paths by
Pathsfin and Paths , respectively.
Definition 2 (Strategy). A strategy pi of an MDP model M
is a function pi : Pathsfin → A that maps a finite path ωfin
of M onto an action in A.
Given a strategy pi, a probability measure over the set of all
paths (under pi) Paths is induced on the resulting Markov
chain [2].
When modeling with MDPs, it might be difficult to
determine the exact values of transition probabilities between
states, especially if the underlying system is unknown. In
such cases, we may consider an interval for each value. The
model that allows the inclusion of these intervals is known
as the bounded-parameter [27] or interval MDP (IMDP) [28],
whose formal definition is as follows.
Definition 3 (IMDP). An interval Markov decision process
(IMDP) is a tuple I = (Q,A, Pˇ , Pˆ ), where Q, A are as in
Def. 1, and
• Pˇ : Q×A×Q→ [0, 1] is a function, where Pˇ (q, a, q′)
defines the lower bound of the transition probability
from state q to state q′ under action a ∈ A(q),
• Pˆ : Q×A×Q→ [0, 1] is a function, where Pˆ (q, a, q′)
defines the upper bound of the transition probability
from state q to state q′ under action a ∈ A(q).
For all q, q′ ∈ Q and a ∈ A(q), it holds that Pˇ (q, a, q′) ≤
Pˆ (q, a, q′) and∑
q′∈Q
Pˇ (q, a, q′) ≤ 1 ≤
∑
q′∈Q
Pˆ (q, a, q′).
Let D(Q) denote the set of discrete probability distributions
over Q. Given q ∈ Q and a ∈ A(q), we call γaq ∈ D(Q) a
feasible distribution reachable from q by a if
Pˇ (q, a, q′) ≤ γaq (q′) ≤ Pˆ (q, a, q′)
for each state q′ ∈ Q. We denote the set of all feasible
distributions for state q and action a by Γaq .
The notions of paths and strategies of IMDPs are analogous
to those of MDPs. An additional notion is the adversary that
chooses feasible distributions.
Definition 4 (Adversary). Given an IMDP I, an adversary
is a function γ : Pathsfin ×A→ D(Q) that, for each finite
path ωfin ∈ Pathsfin and action a ∈ A(last(ωfin)), assigns
a feasible distribution γ(ωfin, a) ∈ Γalast(ωfin).
Given a strategy pi and an adversary γ, a Markov chain
is resulted from an IMDP. This Markov chain defines a
probability measure over the paths of the IMDP [8].
IV. ABSTRACTION
In order to solve Problem 1, we abstract Process (1) as an
IMDP I = (Q,A, Pˇ , Pˆ ) as detailed below.
A. States & Actions
First, we partition the compact safe set Xsafe into
a set of cells (regions) that are non-overlapping. Let
Qsafe = {q1, ..., q|Qsafe|} be the resulting set of cells. Then,
∪q∈Qsafeq = Xsafe, and
q ∩ q′ = ∅, ∀q, q′ ∈ Qsafe, and q 6= q′.
Each region is associated to a state of IMDP I . With an abuse
of notation, q denotes both the region, i.e., q ⊂ Xsafe, as well
as its corresponding IMDP state, i.e, q ∈ Q. From the context,
the correct interpretation of q should be clear. Furthermore,
let qu denote the unsafe set Rn \Xsafe. Then, the set of states
of I is defined as
Q = Qsafe ∪ {qu}.
The set of actions A of I is given by the set of actions in
U , and all actions are allowed to be available at each state
of I, i.e., A(q) = A for all q ∈ Q.
B. Transition Probability Bounds
In order to account for the probabilistic behavior of Process
(1), we define the following conditions for the transition
probability bounds of I:
Pˇ (q, a, q′) ≤ min
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ q
′ | x(k − 1) = x,
u(k − 1) = a,D), (2)
Pˆ (q, a, q′) ≥ max
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ q
′ | x(k − 1) = x,
u(k − 1) = a,D), (3)
for all q, q′ ∈ Q. Notice that even though the action is fixed
in (2) and (3), a probabilistic statement is necessary because
f is unknown and the samples in D are noisy. Conditions
(2) and (3) guarantee that the full probabilistic behavior of
Process (1) is accounted for in the abstraction as shown in
Section V. In order to compute the bounds that satisfy these
conditions, we partition the set of samples D according to
actions a ∈ U , i.e., D = ∪a∈UDa, where
Da = {(xi, a, yi) | (xi, a, yi) ∈ D}.
GP regression on Da for each a results in a Gaussian
posterior distribution characterized by mean µaD and diagonal
covariance matrix ΣaD. Recall that, even though f is unknown
and v is not Gaussian, Lemma 1 allows one to characterize
the distance between the posterior mean µaD and f(·, a).
1) Transitions to Safe States: For all the safe states
q, q′ ∈ Qsafe, the transition probability bounds in (2) and
(3) are given by Proposition 1. In order to state this result,
we introduce the notions of reduction and enlargement of a
compact set.
For a scalar  > 0 and a compact set q ⊂ Rn, let q ⊂ q
be a subset of q such that the distance between each of its
points to the boundary of q is at least . Moreover, let q be
such that q ⊂ q and q contains all the points that are within
a  margin from the boundary of q. Sets q and q are the
-reduced and -enlarged versions of q, respectively. We are
now ready to state the following result:
Proposition 1. Let q, q′ ⊂ Rn be compact sets. For  > 0,
define the enlarged and reduced sets
q′ = {x ∈ Rn | ∃x′ ∈ q′ s.t. ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ }
and
q′ = {x ∈ q′ | ∀x′ ∈ ∂q′, ‖x− x′‖∞ > },
where ∂q′ is the boundary of q′. Then, for a given action
a ∈ U , it holds that
min
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ q
′ | x(k − 1) = x,u(k − 1) = a,D) ≥
min
x∈q
(
1q′(µ
a
D(x))
n∏
i=1
Pr(∀x′ ∈ q, |fi(x′, a)− µai,D(x′)| ≤  | D)
)
,
and
max
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ q
′ | x(k − 1) = x,u(k − 1) = a,D) ≤
max
x∈q
(
1−
n∏
i=1
Pr
(∀x′ ∈ q, |fi(x′, a)− µai,D(x′)| ≤  |
D
)(
1− 1q′(µaD(x))
))
,
where µai,D is the i-th component of vector µ
a
D, and 1H(h) is
the indicator function which is 1 if h ∈ H and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 guarantees that upper and lower bounds of
Pr(x(k) ∈ q′ | x(k−1) ∈ q,u(k−1) = a,D) can be derived
by checking if the posterior mean is within a reduced (or
enlarged) version of q′ and computing a uniform error bound
on the distance between the posterior mean of the GP learnt
via GP regression and f (the underlying dynamics in Process
(1)). Such a bound can be computed by employing Lemma 1.
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 are combined in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let q, q′, q′, q′ be as defined in Proposition 1.
For i ∈ {1, ..., n} consider Bi > 0 such that for a given
a ∈ U , ‖f(·, a)‖κ ≤ Bi. Define βi as in Lemma 1 and
for δ ∈ (0, 1) select  = maxi∈{1,...,n} β
1
2
i (Σ
a,(i,i)
D )
1
2 , where
Σ
a,(i,i)
D is the i-th element of the diagonal of Σ
a
D. Then, it
holds that
min
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ q
′ | x(k − 1) = x,u(k − 1) = a,D) ≥
min
x∈q 1q
′(µaD(x))(1− δ)n,
and
max
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ q
′ | x(k − 1) = x,u(k − 1) = a,D) ≤
max
x∈q
(
1− (1− δ)n(1− 1q′(µaD(x)))
)
.
The proof is obtained by directly applying Lemma 1 to
Proposition 1.
Note that Theorem 1 holds for every choice of constant
δ, and hence of . As discussed in Section VI, this constant
should be selected in order to maximize the tightness of the
bound. In fact,  controls both the tightness of the bound
between the posterior mean and the underlying system and
how much q′ is reduced and enlarged.
Remark 1. Proposition 1 is general; in that, it does not
make use of Assumption 1. It just assumes the existence
of a bound between the posterior mean and the unknown
function. Therefore, it can be applied to other settings where
Assumption 1 is not satisfied. For instance, if function f is
a sample from a GP prior with Gaussian observation noise,
our framework can still be used in combination with existing
error bounds developed for this scenario, such as those in
[21].
2) Transitions to Unsafe State: We obtain upper and lower
bounds for the transitions to the unsafe region qu as a corollary
of Theorem 1. That is, for every q ∈ Qsafe,
Pˇ (q, a,qu) = 1−max
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ Xsafe |
x(k − 1) = x,u(k − 1) = a,D),
Pˆ (q, a,qu) = 1−min
x∈q Pr(x(k) ∈ Xsafe |
x(k − 1) = x,u(k − 1) = a,D).
Both of these terms can be computed by employing Theorem
1. To complete the construction of abstraction I , we make qu
absorbing, i.e., Pˇ (qu, a, qu) = Pˆ (qu, a, qu) = 1 for all a ∈ A,
to ensure that I does not count the transitions to Xsafe from
qu of Process (1) as a safe behavior.
V. VERIFICATION
Given the IMDP abstraction I , we are interested in comput-
ing the probabilities of remaining in Qsafe for T ∈ N∪ {∞}
time steps from every q ∈ Qsafe. Note that, under strategy
pi, the safety probability is a range due to the transition
probability intervals of I . The values in this range correspond
to the feasible transition probabilities γaq ∈ Γaq at every
state q ∈ Q and action a ∈ A chosen by pi. The choice
of this feasible transition probability is made by adversary
γ. Therefore, the minimum safety probability is achieved
when both strategy pi and adversary γ are minimizing the
safety probability. Similarly, the maximum safety probability
is given when both pi and γ are maximizing.
This optimization problem can be formulated through the
Bellman equation as detailed in [8]. Let pˇk(q) and pˆk(q)
denote the minimum and maximum probability of remaining
safe in k time steps starting from state q ∈ Q, respectively.
Then, the safety probability bounds for a finite time duration
T can be computed by T recursive evaluations of
pˇk(q) = min
a∈A(q)
min
γaq∈Γaq
∑
q′∈Q
γaq (q
′) pˇk−1(q′) (4)
pˆk(q) = max
a∈A(q)
max
γaq∈Γaq
∑
q′∈Q
γaq (q
′) pˇk−1(q′) (5)
with initial values of pˇ0(q) = 1 for q ∈ Qsafe and pˇ0(qu) = 0.
In the case of an infinite time horizon T , recursive evaluations
of (4) and (5) need to continue until convergence, which is
guaranteed to occur in finite time [8].
This method of evaluation is similar to value iteration. The
additional step involves first optimizing over the adversaries,
which itself can be performed iteratively via an ordering of
the states in Q according to their values [8]. Once the optimal
adversaries are obtained for all a ∈ A(q), an optimization
over the actions is performed to complete the computation
for one time step in (4) and (5). This algorithm computes the
safety probability bounds pˇT (q) and pˆT (q) for each q ∈ Q.
The complexity of the algorithm is polynomial in the size of
the IMDP I [8].
A. Correctness
The following theorem guarantees that the safety probabil-
ity ranges computed by our framework are sound, i.e., they
give lower and upper bounds for pmin(x) and pmax(x) as
defined in Problem 1.
Theorem 2. Let x ∈ Xsafe and q ∈ Q such that x ∈ q. Then,
it holds that
[pmin(x), pmax(x)] ⊆
[
pˇT (q), pˆT (q)
]
.
VI. CASE STUDIES
We evaluate the performance of our framework in three
case studies. The first case study involves three single-action
linear systems and shows the effect of various choices for
parameter . The second case uses two of the linear systems
to define a switched system with two actions. The final case
considers the safety a nonlinear system.
In all three case studies, Xsafe is a two-dimensional
square defined by the region Xsafe = [−4, 4]× [−4, 4]. We
performed a regression of each dynamical system using a
pair of Gaussian processes, one for each output component.
The GP prior used the zero mean and squared-exponential
functions. The training process used one thousand i.i.d.
(a) pmin for Arotation (b) pmax for Arotation
(c) pmin for Aupper (d) pmax for Aupper
(e) pmin for Alower (f) pmax for Alower
Fig. 1: Minimum and maximum 10-step (T = 10) safety
probability for the linear systems with  = 0.12.
training points with noise parameter σ = 0.01 to optimize the
hyperparameters of the prior functions and train the Gaussian
processes using the GaussianProcesses.jl Julia package [29].
We modified an existing tool to perform the verification over
the resulting IMDP [8].
A. Single-Action Linear Systems
We performed the verification procedure on three linear
systems f(x(k)) = Ai x(k), i ∈ {rotation, upper, lower},
where
Arotation =
[
0.9 −0.4
0.4 0.5
]
,
Aupper =
[
0.8 0.5
0 0.5
]
, Alower =
[
0.5 0
−0.5 0.8
]
.
We discretized the safe set Xsafe into squares with side length
0.25. Figure 1 shows the 10-step safety probability (T = 10)
(a)  = 0.08 (b)  = 0.09
(c)  = 0.10 (d)  = 0.12
Fig. 2: Minimum 2-step safety probability for Arotation for
different values of .
for each cell using  = 0.12. The legend above the figures
maps the intensity of the shade of each cell to a probability
value between zero and one. The white cells in Figures 1(a),
(c) and (e) correspond to a minimum safety probability of
one. If the system is initialized within one of these cells, then
it is certain to remain in the safe set.
Figures 1(a), (c) and (e) also include cells where the
minimum probability of safety is zero due to flow that leaves
the Xsafe before returning. This does not necessarily imply
that it is impossible to stay in the safe set starting at one
of these cells, because the maximum probability of safety
may be greater than zero. The maximum probability for three
systems is shown in Figure 1(b), (d) and (f). These results
indicate that if the system were initialized in the cells with
a maximum probability of safety near zero (e.g. the black
corners in (b), (d) and (f)), it is certain to leave Xsafe. Cells
with a safety probability minimum of zero and maximum
of one essentially indicate a nondeterministic transition to a
safe or unsafe cell after T steps.
The effect on the verification results of reducing  is shown
in Figure 2 for Arotation. The initial surely-safe areas diminish
as  decreases until the minimum safety probability becomes
zero nearly everywhere. This highlights a trade-off when
choosing . Recall that Proposition 1 depends on enlarging
and reducing the target set. Small  shrinks and enlarges
the sets less, which can be beneficial when calculating the
transition probabilities. Small  also tightens the bound on the
distance between the system and the process. Too small, and
(a) T = 1 step (b) T = 1000 steps
Fig. 3: Minimum probability of safety for a switched system
comprised of the Aupper and Alower systems.
the resulting probabilities become trivial everywhere, i.e., a
minimum of zero and maximum of one. However, the choice
of  is also upper-bounded by the size of the discretization
of Xsafe.
B. Switched Linear System
The switched system uses the Aupper and Alower systems
from the previous section, and enables switching between the
two at each time step. The verification used the previous
discretization of Xsafe and  = 0.12. Recall that the
verification problem aims to check if this system remains
in the safe set for all possible strategies. With two actions
available to the system, the worst-case result occurs if one
action could drive the system to an “unsafe” region of the
other action. Figure 3 shows the minimum probability of
safety after one and 1000 steps. Due to the tight results of the
component systems, the verification output of the switched
system happens to be the superposition of the individual
verification outputs. Notably, the system is guaranteed to
remain in the safe set after 1000 steps regardless of the
underlying strategy so long it starts in a cell with a minimum
safety probability of one.
C. Nonlinear System
We demonstrate the verification on a nonlinear system
given by
f(x(k)) = [ x1(k)− 0.05 x2(k), x2(k) + 0.1 sin(x1(k)) ]T
over a discretization of Xsafe with squares of side length 0.25.
The vector field for the true system is shown in Figure 4(a).
Many vectors flow away and out of Xsafe near parts of the
border, while the field slowly spirals away from the origin.
After 1 step, the minimum probability of safety is zero around
parts of the field that flow out of Xsafe shown in Figure 4(b).
However, the non-zero maximum probability of transitioning
to parts of the field that flows out of Xsafe cause the initially-
large set to shrink after successive steps. After 6 steps, safety
can only be guaranteed if the system starts in regions around
the origin.
(a) True Vector Field
(b) T = 1 step (c) T = 2 steps
(d) T = 4 steps (e) T = 6 steps
Fig. 4: Vector fields and the minimum safety probability for
multiple steps of the nonlinear system.
VII. CONCLUSION
We introduced a novel verification framework that generates
safety guarantees for unknown dynamical systems. The ap-
proach is based on GP regression and an uncertain abstraction
that incorporates probabilistic error bounds between the
model learned from data and the underlying system. As
a result, it allows the use of existing verification tools.
This versatile framework paves the way for automatically
generating guarantees for complex, safety-critical systems
that have black-box components.
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